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 On 01/24/2021 Alice thinks of her next birthday. After approximately one rotation of the 
Earth, the number of days that separates her experience from the anticipated event diminishes by 
one unit. Eventually her next birthday will become present and then it will be remembered. In the 
philosophy of time, there are two main explanations of this indubitable fact of our experience. 
One explanation, associated with some form or other of the A theory of time, amounts to the 
claim that time really passes: previously unreal, anticipated events continuously come into being 
in the present and our memories accumulate because past events mind-independently become 
more and more past. The other explanation, associated with the B theory of time, is that the 
universe is a 4-dimensional, static block in which there is no ontologically privileged present and 
the relation between Alice’s anticipations of her birthday on 01/24/2021 and her lived experiences 
the year after is fixed once and for all. The passage of time is an illusion. 
Simon Prosser’s Experiencing Time (2016) is a very brilliant defence of the B-theoretic 
explanation. There are two main merits of the book. The first is the richness of the philosophical 
arguments presented with clarity and discussed with a remarkable analytic skill. The second is 
Prosser’s familiarity with the empirical literature stemming from psychology and the cognitive 
sciences, which is sometimes brought to bear in the philosophical problems in an illuminating way.  
After a brief introduction to the metaphysics of time in chapter 1, in chapter 2 we are 
presented with the main thesis of the book. While the A theorists typically invoke our 
“experience” in support of their dynamic metaphysics, Prosser reverses their argument: he claims 
that it is impossible to experience the passage of time, that expressions like “the passage of time” 
fail to denote and that dynamic theories of time invoking passage are unintelligible. The rest of the 
book is an attempt to defend the B theory by explaining away as illusory all the “experiences” that 
seem to militate in favour of a dynamic theory. As it will become clear in the following, I don’t find 
explanations of our experience postulating a real passage of time unintelligible. 
In the first step of his explanatory project, Prosser addresses the various attitudes that we 
have toward the past and the future (chapter 3). He notes that our untutored beliefs about them 
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are influenced by our grammar, where ‘past’ and ‘future’ are treated as monadic predicates, while 
they really are relations between person stages S at certain times and events (see first paragraph 
above). He claims that one of the mistakes of the A theorist believing in the non-relational 
character of the A properties is her failing to consider that such properties contain the thinking 
subject as an unarticulated component. In this context, Prosser generalizes his semantic analysis 
involving the thinking subject by presenting one of the most central claims of his book, namely 
that the relation of persons to their environment is essentially functional (SEF, or Subject-
Environment Functional Relations). ‘Function’ here is synonymous with ‘causal role’: for any two 
subjects standing in the same SEF relations to their environments, such environments play the 
same role in their lives. 
After an important excursus in the durational aspect of our experience of the rate of change 
of the passage of time (chapter 4), in chapter 5 he defends some needed scepticism about the 
main phenomenological models of our experience of time that are discussed in the literature. He 
claims that the cinematic model (in which the mental act and its contents have a quasi-
instantaneous duration), the retentional model (where the mental episode is quasi-instantaneous, 
but the content is not) and the extensional model (in which both the act and the content are 
temporally extended) are empirically underdetermined. I agree, but then the question one may 
want to ask is: “shouldn’t we drop the whole debate?”. It is not completely clear whether Prosser 
wants to go so far, even if he emphasizes that it is unclear how empirical data could be brought to 
bear to decide among these three models, the main reason being that they all seem to be based 
on a “Cartesian” view of consciousness that has been famously attacked by Daniel Dennett.  
For this reason, I find it puzzling that later in the chapter he illustrates a ‘dynamical snapshot 
theory of our experience’, according to which we perceive an instantaneous present, which serves 
the negative purpose of attacking the view that in order to perceive change, we need a specious 
present. To defend the idea that we can have an instantaneous perception of change, he helps 
himself with a metaphor coming from calculus: “experience has an instantaneous content that 
includes vector rates of change” (chapter 5, p.123, my emphasis). This is problematic: while it is 
true that for their definition instantaneous velocities involve infinitesimally small neighbourhoods 
of a point x, our estimate of the speed and direction of a ball that we want to catch (represented 
by the vector) seem to require some retained information, which is indispensable to anticipate the 
ball’s future direction. Prosser claims that our anticipatory capacities need not involve short-term 
memories of which we are aware. However, it seems difficult to establish whether this difference 
does not fall into the Cartesian theatre problem. In any case, given his stress on SEF, and despite 
his discussion of Nöe’s arguments, Prosser should have given more emphasis to the view that 
perceptions are forms of actions, a fact that may count as an argument in favour of the specious 
present. 
Prosser’s central explanations of why our experience seems to suggest a dynamical element 
is taken up in the last two chapters, which in my view are the most interesting. A first puzzlement 
is generated at the beginning of chapter 6, when he argues that our experience of change has a 
contradictory content even if it does not seem to us this way (p.178). But if our experience has a 
contradictory content, why are we not led to judge the world to be contradictory?2  
His main account of why change seems dynamic is that we perceive objects as persisting in 
time by enduring rather than by perduring. He speculates that the reason why we perceive objects 
as retaining a numerical identity across time depends on hardwired computational economy, 
something that seems to hint to some kind of evolutionary explanation that it would be 
interesting to pursue. In this context he argues that his view of passage is close to Kant’s, who 
claimed that no change can be perceived without assuming that the changing object remains the 
same through time. When Prosser claims that “the passage of time is transcendentally ideal, but 
everything else can be real” (p. 186), he means that, unlike Kant – who claims that all temporal 
features of our experience (persistence, succession and simultaneity) are “transcendentally ideal 
and empirically real” – he is Kantian only about passage.3 According to Kant, it is the permanence 
of objects through time – ensured by the transcendental category of substance – that enables the 
attribution of a temporal order to events. This means that we cannot have an experience of 
succession without permanence and if permanence is necessary for the passage of time, Kant’s 
view justifies the claim that without the experience of passage we would have no experience of 
time whatsoever, not even of B-succession. We could say that the main aim of the book is to show 
against Kant that succession can be disentangled from passage. In addition, we should note in 
order to defend the view that we perceive the world as enduring, Prosser must extend this claim 
also to the identity of the self through time and here his claim seems to be on target: by mentally 
travelling back in time, we project our current self into the past rather than having a current 
memory of an earlier self. 
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Since Prosser’s explanation of the dynamic character of our experience hinges almost 
exclusively on the claim that we perceive objects as enduring rather than as perduring, he needs 
to assume that the dispute between endurantism and perdurantism is genuine. I have my 
reservations here. Mount Everest is typically considered to be a 3-D, enduring object rather than a 
perduring, 4D object because, we are told, it has no temporal parts and is “always present at any 
moment of its existence”. But we can legitimately and without any loss of meaning redescribe the 
enduring object Mount Everest as the mereological sum of all the time slices composing its full 
spatiotemporal volume in spacetime. The possibility of this redescription may imply that the 
dispute between stage theorists and endurantists is purely verbal. My table can be regarded as an 
enduring object from a certain macroscopic viewpoint (its properties don’t change too quickly) but 
it can also be regarded as being identical with the sum of the constant changes and motions of its 
microscopic structure at all instants of its existence. In this alternative description, the table is a 
perduring entity because it is different at any moment of its existence and the relation of 
continuity is weaker than that of identity. The same (macro)objects can perdure because at our 
scale they typically don’t change their properties very quickly, but from another viewpoint they 
can be said to perdure because of the constant changes in their microstructure. 
In the last chapter there is a brilliant attempt to explain why humans use so many spatial 
metaphors to describe their experience of time: our death is “approaching”, our birth is 
“receding”, we “are looking forward” to a certain event, etc. If our reliance on these metaphors is 
the main reason why we believe in the passage of time, explaining their origin is very important 
for the main project of the book. In order to explain why future events seem to approach us in 
time, he uses his SEF relations, and he invites us to remove from them any spatial connotation, so 
as to arrive at a pure “approaching relation” between a person stage and an event, which holds 
for both space and time: “The SEF relation in which one stands to an approaching event is thus 
very closely related to, albeit not identical to, the SEF relation in which one stands to an object 
approaching through space.” (p. 189). This may be correct, but it is not incompatible with the view 
that events come into being one after the other along local worldlines, as a defender of an 
objective passage of time would put it.  
By stressing the subject-environment approaching relation, Prosser’s explanation of our 
sense of motion through time presupposes that this relation is the only spatial metaphor that we 
use of time. However, one should note that while in European languages the future is represented 
as being in front of us and approaching and the past behind us and receding, in other languages 
(the Aymara spoken in the Andes, for instance) ‘past’ means ‘ahead’ (we know the past more than 
the future, after all!) and the future means ‘behind’.4 In Mandarine Chinese, down refers to future 
events, so that “next week” becomes “down week”, while “last week” becomes “up one week”. It 
seems reasonable to conclude that Prosser’s approaching relation has a cultural origin but that the 
metaphor of motion in space is a universal. If this is correct, studies on the so-called mental time 
travel may shed new light on why spatial metaphors are so important in our representation of 
time. Possibly, the fact that the neural mechanisms involved in the representation of mental space 
travel and mental time travel are different5 may have some important philosophical consequence. 
Given Prosser’s openness to new empirical studies (p.191), he would certainly welcome results of 
this kind, which, however, he does not mention. 
Passing now to a general evaluation of this thought-provoking book, my main objection to 
the view that the passage of time is illusory is based on the fact that our brains evolved to 
anticipate the future. This is evident from the most automatic sensory-motors mechanism: we 
open our mouth before putting the food inside it. In general, to anticipate a future event F entails 
a robustly justified belief that F, relative to the moment in which we decide to act, does not exist. 
Since I take this to be a moorean fact that must be captured by any metaphysical theory of time, 
illusory approaches to the passage of time face a dilemma. If the metaphysical dispute between 
static and dynamic theories is not purely verbal, views like Prosser’s cannot fully recover the 
meaning of central terms like anticipation or causation. In this case, however, they are 
unsatisfactory because these terms are needed for any explanation of our actions, which entails 
that they cannot be stretched to the point of rupture. Or, if they can recover such meanings, the 
result of the translation is indistinguishable from moderately dynamical views in which time 
passes independently of our mind.   
To exemplify, within dynamic and static metaphysics alike, it is false to claim that, at the 
moment M in which we anticipate them, future events “already exist”. Relative to M, they exist 
only when they become present. The introduction of an unrestricted quantification could obviate 
the well-known charge of triviality, since it would enable one to claim that, according to the static 
theorist, the anticipated events “exists simpliciter” also in the present. In typical dynamical views, 
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instead, these events would come into being in the present, and at M they would not exist 
(simpliciter). 
However, in our context the introduction of unrestricted quantification can only be admitted 
if one is ready to countenance the view that it makes sense to claim that we anticipate something 
that is located in the future but that nevertheless exists simpliciter. Here’s the rub. Either the 
meaning of ‘anticipate’ in this context is not stretched to the point of rupture, which seems hardly 
plausible. Or some minimal dynamic view must be admitted: by following Savitt and Dieks (and 
myself in their wake), there seems to be no harm in claiming that anticipated events relationally 
come into being by happening. We would arrive at the same conclusion by choosing the first horn, 
since in this case one ought to argue that it is always possible to paraphrase the anticipatory talk – 
that requires a coming into being as a matter of meaning – by invoking Prosser’s unchanging 
relations between subjects’ temporal stages and events. Translations of this kind, however, should 
make one worry about the real difference between moderately dynamic views of time that do 
justice to our talk of anticipating the future (the second horn), and their “static” paraphrases. The 
dilemma is solved in favour of the view that time really passes in the moderately dynamic sense.  
The same point holds for causation. Like before, we are facing a dilemma. Either the claim 
that ‘we cause an event that before our action is located in the future but exists unrestrictedly’ 
does not change the meaning of ‘causation’, a claim that I find implausible. Or, as before, we 
accept that anticipated events come into being simply by happening and that we cause their 
happenings via our action. If one insisted that the first horn can be accepted, the cluster of 
meanings constituting the concept of causation – requiring bringing about future events – should 
be reformulated in terms of the second option, which requires a real though “deflationary” 
passage of time.  
In general, as in many discussions about the philosophy of time, when metaphysics prevails 
over the empirical dimension the debate, I find it difficult to distinguish the positions at stake. In 
part this is due to the vagueness of the term “experience of time”, which in the literature is too 
often used as an umbrella term: if we don’t know exactly what “experience” means, we don’t 
know in what sense our experience of time can be as illusory as one due to refraction. In one 
sense, ‘experience of time’ may refer to a phenomenological aspect (covered in part in chapter 5). 
In another sense, our experience of time could be regarded as a quale, but Prosser correctly claims 
that this not the case (chapter 7, p.186). In yet another sense, it may refer to a durational aspect, 
instructively tackled in chapter 4. However, in this option, one may want to further distinguish a 
few-seconds long mental integrations windows – currently the target of many empirical studies6 –  
from longer intervals of time that involve the working memory and that have to do with the 
experience of the continuity of our embodied self. All of these different senses of ‘experience of 
time’ are often merged to the detriment of clarity. Prosser’s book has the remarkable merit to 
have made significant progress in distinguishing among them by also bringing to bear empirical 
data. Yet, as it happens when I read books as brilliant as this one on the philosophy of time, I feel 
that an even stronger interaction between the metaphysics and the science of time would be 
more fruitful to both disciplines. 
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